India's China Policy: 'One-China' or 'Two-China'?

My article on India's China Policy published by the esteemed MyIndMakers.

https://www.myind.net/Home/viewArticle/indias-china-policy-one-china-or-two-china

After the bloody border clash at Galwan valley in eastern Ladakh of India, China did not show any intent of disengagement. On the contrary, China has been steady in deploying more military forces and building military infrastructure along the line of actual control (LAC). 

India has been preparing for a long haul to counter China militarily in LAC along with other diplomatic and strategic measures. In the meantime, the Indian military has recaptured few strategic heights in Pangong lake areas and the Indian government has made another strike on Chinese apps including money-spinner PUBG. In this context, what should be India's long term policy on China: One-China or Two-China policy?

China- Mainland & Taiwan island

Now, the most pertinent question comes to our mind: Whether China means one country and a state, or two countries or two states? Let us go back briefly to the twentieth century history of China. Under the leadership of San Yat-sen, the Kuomintang (KMT- Chinese Nationalist Party) had ousted the Qing dynasty in 1912 and established the Republic of China (ROC). After the death of San Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek took the leadership of the Kuomintang in 1928 and headed the nationalist government and tried to unify China on the principles of democracy, nationalism and Confucianism. But in the meantime, the Communist Party of China (CPC), founded in 1921, came into direct conflict with Kuomintang to snatch the state power. During the Second World War, China survived the invasion of Japan under the strategic leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. After the surrender of Japan in October 1945, Taiwan island, formerly 'Formosa', came again under the control of China.

But soon the Chinese Civil War resumed again between KMT and CPC, and the CPC under the Chairmanship of Mao Zedong defeated Chiang's nationalists and wrested mainland China and founded the People's Republic of China (PRC). Chiang Kai-shek was compelled to retreat to Taiwan island in 1949 and continued the old ROC government there. Till 1971 this Taiwan ROC represented China in UNSC and then the mainland PRC took over the mantle. So, since 1949 there remains a political question regarding the status of both the governments representing the whole of China.

India's Reaction

India had recognised the CPC-led PRC in 1950 and severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan ROC following the 'One-China' policy. India again supported the PRC government in 1971 in UN membership and Security Council seat-claiming resolution. Much later Indian government re-established cultural relationships with the Taiwan ROC and both the governments established embassy-like centres in both countries.

Now the questions arise: Given the facts of 'Salami slicing' policy of China to grab Indian territory from the very beginning, how far is it tenable for India to pursue One-China policy diplomatically as well as strategically? From Aksai Chin to the entire area of LAC and CPEC programme through the PoK, Chinese aggression has been a direct challenge to the sovereignty of India. China's protest in abolishing Article 370 to integrate Kashmir and creating Ladakh as a separate union territory by India remains the same even after a year. It is now crystal clear that China has been consistent with its de facto Two-India policy to interfere in the internal affairs of India. In this context India should also review her One-China policy to counter PRC-China head-on.

India and Two-China

Right from 1950 India has a hesitant mindset regarding China following 'one step forward, two steps backward' type of policy measures. When the communist PRC captured Tibet, the Indian government didn't utter any protest. Even India relinquished her own legitimate claim on Aksai Chin when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China occupied the strategic area silently. Finally India surrendered meekly before the communist Chinese aggression in 1962 as a result of undue tolerance, appeasing mentality, unpreparedness and hollow 'Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai' brotherhood policy! The question is: how much India came out of that Nehruvian mindset of China policy even in 2020? 

One thing must be borne in the right perspective that there was almost no difference in economic power between India and China up to 1980s. The real differences were in the mindset and lack of vision of the national leadership. It is now a necessity for a metamorphosis of India which has been brandished as a 'Soft Nation'. The question is: How?

India and Multipolar World

During 1962 Chinese aggression, the United States of America had taken steps against China favouring India. Again, during the India-Pakistan War in 1971 Russia stood by India against the US. Of course, China didn't intervene in the 1965 Indo-Pak War in favour of Pakistan. All these interventions had been part and parcel of the equations of the 'Cold War' era. The Non-aligned Movement (NAM) had almost no role in insulating India from either Chinese aggression or Pakistani misadventures. In the post-Cold war era after the fall of the communist bloc, Asia now becomes the centre of global geo-politics with the steady rise of China, particularly in the 21st century. The 'unipolar' world of early post-Cold war scenario with the American hegemony has now been transformed into a 'multipolar' world with China challenging the US in every front- politically, militarily and economically. For China, India has been the only potential power in Asia who can challenge Chinese dominance squarely. Now is the time for India to take a pole-position in the multipolar global politics in Asian stage out of a necessary compulsion to defend her own national interest.

Not only ASEAN countries but also countries like Tajikistan in Central Asia are facing the onslaughts of Chinese expansionism. China has now been claiming the Pamir mountain range in Tajikistan with its evil eye on gold mines on the basis of so-called historical records. It is clear that the agenda of communist China is to establish a modern-version of colonialism from the South-China Sea through the Indian Ocean Region to Africa up to Europe via Pakistani Gwadar port to Central Asia using BRI and maritime Silk route in the name of 'development and connectivity'. India has no alternative but to resist and counter this expansionist China.

4C Paradigm

Now is the time for India to adopt the '4C Paradigm' - 'Cooperation-Competition-Confrontation-Conflict Paradigm' in relation to neighbourhood relationship as a stated policy. From the Doklam standoff through the Uri surgical strike to the Balakot air strike India has shown a forceful reactive resistance indicating a metamorphosis of a soft nation. India is now poised to shift gears from a reactive to proactive policy as an overall strategic shift in foreign policy. 

In case of China, the first step of this proactive policy of India is to adopt the Two-China policy instead of hitherto One-China policy maintained by India like that of China using two-faced insidiousness. India must follow the Chanakya’s principles of Sama-Dana-Bheda-Danda strategy to uphold her national interest against the 'Gunboat diplomacy' used by China. 'Softly softly' approach of 'Quiet diplomacy' of India would have no desired results against a bullying China. Then the strategic step is to establish diplomatic relations with the Taiwan government in a phased manner with the conditions of recognising McMohan Line and Johnson Line along LAC, and the Tibet government-in-exile by Taiwan. The Indian government must also think over the recognition of the Tibet government-in-exile in a major policy shift.

The USA has very recently taken the decision to export the state-of-the-art F-16 fighter jets and other arms to Taiwan amidst Chinese protest. 

Nomenclature does matter and nomenclature policy is also a part of the overall foreign policy of a nation. Like renaming NEFA as Arunachal Pradesh, India may rename Aksai Chin as 'Aksai Hind' and a part of the Pamir region as 'Uttarakuru' in her diplomatic jargons using 'Epic diplomacy'. Indic cultural roots have to be used fully to counter Chinese expansionism which is based on 'Once-upon-a-time' type of historical claims. 

Hedging Policy

By consolidating 'Quad' of India, US, Australia and Japan in Indian Ocean Region (IOR) as well as in South-China Sea areas and particularly in Malacca straits, India must hedge the imminent Chinese naval power and take the leading position in controlling the region using the strategic theatre command of Andaman & Nicobar military base. Not only that, India has a historical-cultural obligation to be a hedging power for the ASEAN countries in their resistance to the Chinese aggression.

To be an influential nation in Central Asia, India needs to use the Chabahar port project of Iran strategically on one hand, and plan to get back PoK and Gilgit-Baltistan on the other hand as a long-term policy imperative and get ready to take part in the Great Game. 

There is no doubt that China under the life-long premier Xi Jinping wouldn't backtrack from its expansionist policy. So it is an Indian imperative to reconsider her one-China policy. Now, India has to play a balancing role by being a major player in the 'Alliance of Democracies' with the US as well as a stakeholder in the 'Alliance of Partners' with Russia in Central Asia. 

Lastly, proactive policy requires a solid economic base. In one hand, India has to be on economic growth trajectory as early as possible through economic reforms in post-Covid phase and on the other hand, India must adopt a proactive policy diplomatically, politically and strategically so that India's historical roles in Asia remains undaunted and her roles in world politics get due weightage by being a permanent member in UN Security Council with democratic reforms in UN.

@ Sujit Roy

04.09.2020